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Diagnosing Homicidal Mania: Forensic Psychiatry
and the Purposeless Murder
JOEL PETER EIGEN*
Dear Mr. Shaw—I received your letter on last Tuesday. I think I will get hung, but I do not care as
long as I get a good breakfast before they hang me. If they do not hang me I think I will commit
suicide. That will do just as well. I will strangle myself. I hope you are well. I go up on Monday to
the Old Bailey to be tried, I hope you will be there. I think they will sentence me to die. If they do I
will call all the witnesses liars. I remain
Yours affectionately,
R A Coombes
It is not every criminal defendant in late Victorian England who writes to the medical
ofﬁcer of the prison, inviting him to attend his trial and more than likely, his execution.
The defendant had already discussed his forthcoming date at the Old Bailey with the prison
doctor in a mood that bordered on ebullience: “he appeared in very great glee at being
about to be ...tried ...he thought it would be a splendid sight ...he said he would wear
his best clothes and have his boots well polished—then he began to talk about his cats”. It
might seem odd to shift the conversation so easily from a possible death sentence to asking
about one’s pets, but then, thirteen-year-old boys are often concerned about their pets, even
thirteen-year-old boys who conspire with a younger brother to murder their mother and
leave her body to rot for a week.
TestifyingatthetrialoftheyoungdefendantinSeptemberl895,theprisonmedicalofﬁcer
told the jury that the boy’s note had been accompanied by a series of illustrated panels:
Then followed a drawing of a gibbet and two ﬁgures being pushed forward by another; over the last
ﬁgurewaswritten,“Executioner.”Thatwasheaded,“Scene1,goingtotheScaffold.”Then“SceneII”,
a drawing of a gibbet with a person being hanged and the words, “Goodbye” issuing from his mouth,
and the writing, “Here goes nothing!” ...“P.S. Excuse the scaffold, I was too heavy. I bent it.”
In wide-ranging testimony that spanned organic to functional causes of insanity, the phys-
ician informed the court, “There is a distinct scar on his right temple, and on very careful
examination I noticed also a very faint scar just in front of his left ear—those scars might
have been caused by instruments used at the time of his birth ...I asked him whether he
heard voices—he said at night he heard voices saying ‘kill her, kill her, and run away’”,
which is exactly what young Robert Coombes did after his younger brother Nathaniel gave
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him the signal that the time was right to stab their mother. As his reason for the murder, the
boy cited his fear “that if he did not do so, she would kill his younger brother [since] she
had threatened to knock his brains out with a hatchet [having] thrown knives at him”.
The focus of the medical witness’s testimony was not the boy’s difﬁcult delivery and
likely “brain compression”, but his gleeful expectation about the forthcoming trial: “whilst
in prison he never appeared to realise his position, or showed remorse for the crime he
had committed”. The medical witness ascribed the boy’s seeming moral obliviousness, and
the likely consequence of his act, to a mysterious disease that, by the end of the nineteenth
century, hadgrowninacceptancetorivalthemostfrequentlycitedreasonsgivenbymedical
witnesses as grounds for inferring insanity. As the jury learned,
There are two forms of homicidal mania: sometimes the crime is committed on the impulse of the
moment; sometimes with great deliberation and cunning ...I have been studying criminal lunacy
more or less for the last twenty-three years—in my opinion these symptoms will be characteristic of
the boy during his life.
Under cross-examination, the medical ofﬁcer of Holloway addressed the supposedly sane
elements that surrounded the deranged assault: “I seriously mean that he would go to the
shop, select the knife, bargain for it, and buy it while under the inﬂuence of mania; under
the inﬂuence of homicidal mania these crimes are done with great deliberation.” Asked
speciﬁcally by the judge to describe the mental state accompanying such an attack of this
particularmania, thedoctoranswered, “thepersonwouldnotknowthenatureandqualityof
the act he was doing” or “the difference between right or wrong”. Whether it was the scars
on the boy’s temples, the family doctor testifying to his history of “irresistible impulses”,
or indeed the diagnosis of homicidal mania that the prison doctor proffered, thirteen-year-
old Robert Coombes was never to glimpse the scaffold he drew with such artistic ﬂair.
Eventually found guilty but insane for the brutal slaying of his mother, he was detained
indeﬁnitely “awaiting the Queen’s pleasure”.1
Although one might be tempted to dismiss the case of young Robert Coombes as anom-
alous in the day-to-day calendar at the Old Bailey—thirteen-year-old boys rarely faced
trial for murder, and rarer still, for the killing of a parent—invoking homicidal mania to
characterize the defendant’s particular species of insanity revealed a qualitative change
in the language of nineteenth-century descriptive psychopathology. For the ﬁrst time in a
150-year effort to fashion medical condition to legal criterion, the Old Bailey jury would
be faced with a diagnosis of insanity that inserted homicide into its own name.
Mental Medicine and Inexplicable Crime
The vivid testimony given in the trial of this young defendant can be found in an invalu-
able series of courtroom narratives, taken down in shorthand as the trial was progressing,
transcribed at night, and sold on the London street the next day. They remain the most com-
prehensive primary material that today’s historians of law and medicine are ever likely to
have of the language used by medical men and lay witnesses to describe their observations
oftheprisoner’sbehaviourandtojustifythegroundsforinferringmentalaberrancy.Making
1 Old Bailey Sessions Papers (hereafter OBSP),
l895, case 720, 11th sess., pp. 996–1018.
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theirappearanceinl674andprintedcontinuouslyuntill9l3, TheOldBaileySessionsPapers
(hereafterOBSP)areacriticalsourceforcapturingthetextureofcourtroomdynamics.They
offer not only the voice of the emerging specialist in mental medicine but also the language
employed by the judge, attorney, lay witness, and jurors who occasionally questioned the
medical witness directly. In some trials, the most audible voice belongs to the prisoner him-
self, who obstinately demanded that the physician justify his reasons for ﬁnding him mad.2
Although medical men were long familiar to the London courtroom in their capacity as
specialist witnesses to advise the jury on the timing and cause of death, their participation
in trials featuring an insanity plea dates only to 1760.3 Given that the ﬁrst acquittal on the
grounds of “unsound mind” was recorded in 1505, medical witnesses appearing to argue
the presence of insanity found themselves in a forum that was accustomed to relying upon
the recollections of the prisoner’s relatives and neighbours who, the common law had long
assumed, were in the best position to recount the verbal pandemonium and frightening
histrionics of the accused.4 Unlike a victim of stabbing found with no blood in her wounds
or a drowned man whose lungs “gave no water”, there seemed little need for the services of
a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians to decipher the conspicuous, indeed theatrical
signs of ﬂorid mental derangement. In the eighteenth century, Roy Porter has famously
written, madness was “spectacularly on view ...doubts about nature’s legibility troubled
few”.5
Porter’s observation is supported by the OBSP, which reveal that an eighteenth-century
mad doctor faced a more daunting task than the toxicologist or the general practitioner: he
had to convince the jury that lay perceptions of madness could be misleading because the
non-specialist, fooled by surface impressions, lacked the broad experience and sustained
familiaritywiththeuniverseofthementallyderangedto“persistintheinterview”.6 Intime,
2 In 18l3, a medical witness was compelled to
respond to a prisoner’s query calling for the grounds
for his inference of insanity. The apothecary to St
Luke’s Hospital replied, “From your action, and ideas,
and your general conduct told me that you were an
improper person to be at liberty.” The prisoner
responded sharply, “You judge from ideas; you have a
good opinion of yourself.” OBSP, 18l3, case 11,
1st sess., p. 14. In the trial of Hugh Pollard
Willoughby, the allegedly mad prisoner extracted
from the prison surgeon, Gilbert McMurdo, an
admission that if the prisoner’s construction of the
events were accurate, he could not be described as
suffering from a delusion (OBSP, l854, case 1122,
12th sess., pp. 1361–71). For the historical importance
of the OBSP for reconstructions of the courtroom, see
John H Langbein, ‘The criminal trial before the
lawyers’, Univ. Chicago Law Rev., 1978, 45: 263–316,
and idem, ‘Shaping the eighteenth-century criminal
trial: a view from the Ryder sources’, Univ. Chicago
Law Rev., l983, 50: 1–136.
3 Nigel Walker, Crime and insanity in England,
vol. 1, The historical perspective, Edinburgh
University Press, 1968. Walker credits the testimony
of John Monro, Physician Superintendent of Bedlam
at the l760 trial of Earl Ferrers as the ﬁrst time a
medical witness appeared in an English trial to speak
to insanity as a medical condition, pp. 60–2.
4 For the date of the l505 acquittal, “the felon was
of unsound mind ...[w]herefore it was decided that
he should go free”, see Walker, op. cit., note 3 above,
pp. 25–6. On the common law’s reliance upon lay
witnesses, see Joel P Eigen, Witnessing insanity:
madness and mad-doctors in the English court,N e w
Haven, Yale University Press, 1995, pp. 82–107.
5 Roy Porter, Mind-forg’d manacles: a history of
madness in England from the Restoration to the
Regency, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,
l987, p. 35.
6 The apothecary and author John Haslam
famously observed in l8l7, “Ordinary persons have
been much deceived by the temporary display of
rational discourse ...[but] ...the experienced will ...
ﬁnd by some unaccountable association, even
ordinary topics are linked to—the madman’s darling
delusions—the map of his mind will point out that the
smallest rivulet ﬂows into the great stream of his
derangement”, Medical jurisprudence, as it relates to
insanity: according to the laws of England, London,
C Hunter, J Hunter and Taylor and Hessey, 18l7,
pp. 15–19.
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the trial narratives reveal an increasingly conﬁdent voice and self-possessed professional
posture on the part of the nineteenth-century alienists—often at the prompting of attorneys
and judges.7 Coincident with this assertive professional bearing was the witness’s use
of innovative disease classiﬁcations, found in late Victorian medical texts and journals
in both England and France, which were making their way into the London courtroom
as well.
In the 153 years that separated the ﬁrst trial in which medical witnesses appeared at the
Old Bailey to testify about insanity as a medical condition (1760) and the year that the
Papers cease publication (1913), some form of mental distraction surfaced in the prosecu-
tion of 1,008 prisoners, the majority raising insanity in their defence, the remainder being
found unﬁt to plead. The years from 1760 to 1843 and from 1844 to 1876 have already
been examined with regard to medical diagnoses given to the jury, changes in professional
afﬁliation of medical witnesses, and the continuing efforts of the new specialists in mental
medicine to enlarge the scope of the law’s conception of insanity and, in response, the law’s
steadfast refusal to accept ever more expanding bases to pronounce irresponsibility.8 The
focusofthislivelydebateturnedononeoverridingissue: whethermedicaltestimonywould
continue to conﬁne itself to opinions regarding an impairment of the cognitive faculties—
knowing the nature of one’s acts, knowing the difference between right and wrong—or
whether jury deliberations would move beyond intellectual error to consider a derangement
in emotions: an affective insanity.
Beginning with Philippe Pinel’s proffered neologism, manie sans délire, and continuing
into a second generation of disease entities put forward by his students Jean-Etienne-
Dominique Esquirol and Etienne-Jean Georget, asylum doctors and medical writers in
the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth-century proposed the existence of a clear-thinking insan-
ity capable of impelling the deranged into desperate acts, quite beyond their voluntary
control.9 England’s most vocal proponent of such derangement in affect was James
Cowles Prichard, whose formulation “moral insanity” described a species of insanity in
which
the intellectual faculties appear to have sustained little or no injury ...the moral and active principles
of the mind are strangely perverted and depraved; the power of self government is lost or greatly
impaired, and the individual is found to be incapable, not of talking or reasoning upon any subject
proposed, for this he will often do with great shrewdness and volubility, but of conducting himself
with decency and propriety in the business of life.10
A derangement of feelings, temper, and habit provided the conceptual home for irresist-
ibleanduncontrollableimpulses,whichenteredOldBaileytestimonythroughthediagnoses
7 Joel P Eigen, “‘I answer as a physician”: opinion
as fact in pre-McNaughtan insanity trials’, in Michael
Clark and Catherine Crawford (eds), Legal medicine
in history, Cambridge University Press, l994,
pp. 167–99.
8 For the years 1760–1843, see Eigen, op. cit.,
note 4 above. The years 1844 to 1876 are examined
in Joel P Eigen, Unconscious crime: mental absence
and criminal responsibility in Victorian London,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
2003.
9 On Pinel’s announced discovery of “paroxysms
of maniacal fury, unaccompanied by any lesion of the
intellect”, see Philippe Pinel, A treatise on insanity,
transl.DDD a vis, Shefﬁeld, W Todd, 1806,
pp. 152–4. For an analysis of the contributions of
Georget and Esquirol more generally to the school of
médecine mentale, see Jan Goldstein, Console and
classify: the French psychiatric profession in the
nineteenth century, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
10 James Cowles Prichard, A treatise on insanity,
London, Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, 1835, p. 5.
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of moral insanity and “lesion of the will”.11 That they found their way into the London
courtroom most conspicuously in the trial of Edward Oxford for an attempted assassination
of the Queen ensured both public and juridical consideration of the possible signiﬁcance of
a derangement of morals for the attribution of criminal responsibility.12 Oxford’s eventual
acquittal prompted the court’s interest in clarifying as soon as possible the law’s position
regarding the necessary and sufﬁcient type of derangement for the purposes of the common
law, taking only three years to ﬁnd a case with which to articulate the enduring grounds
for an insanity defence. Known as the McNaughtan Rules, the criteria resulting from the
controversial 1843 acquittal conspicuously excluded any mention of moral insanity, lesion
of the will, or impulsive derangement. Insanity would remain, as far as the English court
was concerned, a matter of intellectual derangement: a perversion of the knowing faculties
most frequently revealed in delusion.13 First articulated in court in 1800, delusion served
not only as the distinguishing element between lay and medical testimony but also as the
most frequently invoked medico-legal term cited by early-nineteenth-century mad doctors
to justify the inference of insanity.14
The effort on the part of the common law judges to restrict the grounds for a jury’s
ﬁndingofinsanityand, byextension, thescopeofmedicaltestimonyplaysoutdramatically
in the pages of the Old Bailey narratives. Having gained a foothold in the courtroom by the
time of McNaughtan—medical witnesses were by the mid-1840s appearing in nine of ten
insanitytrialspromptedbyapersonalassault—thesenewcourtroomspecialistswerenotso
easily muzzled. The McNaughtan Rules, so conﬁdently invoked in the legal literature as the
criteria that would serve to deﬁne insanity, were in fact rarely mentioned at the Old Bailey
in the decades following their formation.15 The centrality of cognitive error to the law’s
conception of insanity, however, endured into successive nineteenth-century trials. Asylum
doctors and alienists who veered into language that touched on moral insanity were met
11 Eigen, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 149–53.
“Lesion of the will” was addressed speciﬁcally by
Esquirol in his effort to articulate the variations of
monomania. “In a third class of cases, a lesion of the
will exists. The patient is drawn ...to the commission
of acts, to which neither reason nor sentiment
determine, which conscience rebukes, and which the
will has no longer the power to restrain. The actions
are involuntary, instinctive, and irresistible. This is
monomania without delirium,o r ,instinctive
monomania. ”JEDEsquirol, Mental maladies; a
treatise on insanity, transl. E K Hunt, Philadelphia,
Lea and Blanchard, 1845, p. 320.
12 OBSP, 1840, case 1877, 9th sess., pp. 464–510.
For the political context in which the Oxford trial took
place, see Richard Moran, ‘The punitive uses of the
insanity defense: the trial for treason of Edward
Oxford (1840)’, Int. J. Law Psychiatry, l986, 9:
171–90.
13 McNaughtan’s trial can be found at OBSP,
1842–43, case 874, 5th sess., pp. 721–63. The
McNaughtan Rules resulted from the questions asked
by the House of Lords of the judges in the celebrated
trial, to be found in McNaughtan Case, 10 Clark and
Finnelly, pp. 203–14. Reactions from contemporary
jurists can be found in Richard Moran, Knowing right
from wrong: the insanity defense of Daniel
McNaughtan, New York, Free Press, 1981, see esp.
pp. 168–75.
14 Joel P Eigen, ‘Delusion in the courtroom: the
role of partial insanity in early forensic testimony’,
Med. Hist., 1991, 35: 25–49.
15 Although the McNaughtan Rules provided
criteria for judicial instructions, neither the Court of
Crown Cases Reserved nor indeed any other English
court delivered a deﬁnitive ruling regarding the
relationship of insanity to criminal responsibility.
McNaughtan’s status as an authoritative ruling was
“doubtful” according to the most esteemed jurist of
the era, James Fitzjames Stephen. In part this was
because the nature of insanity was argued anew at
every trial. Assertions to expertise were proffered;
judges, attorneys, and juries reacted in ways that had
more to do with the particular elements of the offence
than with the formal legal strictures. See James
Fitzjames Stephen, A history of the criminal law of
England, 3 vols, London, Macmillan, 1883, vol. 2,
p. 153.
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withjudgeswhointerruptedtheirtestimonytoask: “Hassheanydelusionatall?”16 Inprint,
physicians bristled at the law’s “constricted” view of insanity; in court, medical witnesses
balked at questions that restricted their testimony to intellectual derangement.17 Still, it was
a legal, not a medical forum in which asylum physicians and general practitioners found
themselves. AreviewofcourtroomtestimonyinthedecadesfollowingMcNaughtanreveals
theneardisappearanceofmoralinsanityandirresistibleimpulsefromOldBaileytrials. The
possibility of a discrete derangement of affect, however, remained a lively topic of debate
in the medical literature.
Although delusion continued to characterize the common law’s notion of an appropriate
basis for an insanity plea in the second half of the nineteenth century, the decades imme-
diately following McNaughtan were notable for the introduction of extraordinary states of
consciousness—or rather, unconsciousness—in courtroom testimony. Sleepwalkers, auto-
matons, andpersonsafﬂictedwithapeculiarvariationofepilepsybegantoappearattheOld
Bailey from the midpoint of the 1800s. Vertige épileptique featured in medical testimony
from 1876, introduced initially during the tragic case of a mother who had entered her
kitchen with her infant daughter in her hands, intending to slice off a piece of bread. Once
in the kitchen, Elizabeth Carr descended into a state of mental suspension, described by
French clinicians as a period of absence separating two convulsive seizures. Persons in this
state might carry on a conversation or perform feats of remarkable dexterity, but following
a second convulsion, they “came to” only to discover that whatever was said or done in the
intervening minutes was lost to them. In this episode of dissociation, Elizabeth Carr had
sliced off her daughter’s hand and was eventually placed on trial for assault with intent to
murder.
Togetherwiththeothercourtroomparticipants, thepitiablemotherlistenedasDrEdward
Merrion, physician to the Hospital for Diseases of the Nervous System, explained the
features of vertige épileptique, concluding, “it is not looked upon by [my] profession as
insanity in any form”. Rejecting all possible ﬁndings open to them, the jurors fashioned
their own basis for an acquittal: not guilty on the grounds of unconsciousness. The verdict
shocked the court and outraged the judge, who promptly refused to release the prisoner,
electing to treat the jury’s ﬁnding as equivalent to an insanity acquittal and called for the
defendant’s indeﬁnite detention.18 Still, epileptic vertigo had unambiguously entered the
English courtroom, and not for this one trial only. Six months after the tragic mother had
been acquitted (but detained), another prisoner enlisted epileptic vertigo in a perplexing,
totally unprovoked fatal assault on his best friend.19 At the conclusion of the trial, the
judge asked the jury to consider if the prisoner had “labour[ed] under such an afﬂiction of
Providence that he was for the moment deprived of consciousness to such an extent that
16 For examples, see OBSP, 1849–50, case 1300,
9th sess.; OBSP, 1851–52, case 572, 7th sess.; OBSP,
1866–67, case 912, 11th sess. The centrality of
delusion to law can be found in both legal and medical
opinion. See, respectively, Stephen, op. cit., note 15
above, and Alfred Swaine Taylor: “The acts of the
insane generally arise from motives based on
delusion”, in The principles and practice of medical
jurisprudence, London, J Churchill, 1865, p. 1106.
17 Some medical authors had long been
contemptuous of the elevation of delusion as the sole
criterion for inferring insanity. “Is deluded
imagination a signiﬁcant characterization for the
naked wanderer? [T]hose who recover describe it no
otherwise than a total suspension of every rational
faculty”, John Monro, Remarks on Dr. Battie’s
treatise on madness, London, John Clarke,
1758, p. 6.
18 OBSP, 1875–76, case 413, 11th sess., pp. 495–7.
19 The Times, 9 Feb. 1877, p. 5f. The trial of
Frederick Treadaway can be found at OBSP, 1876–77,
case 246, 4th sess., pp. 434–60.
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he was a mere automaton from an attack of epileptic vertigo”.20 Two years later, a judge
in Scotland incorporated a similar state of unconsciousness in his instructions to a jury
during a trial that featured the horriﬁc killing of an adored young boy by his sleepwalking
father.21
Crimes of the unconscious were not instances of moral insanity. Defendants who put
forward extraordinary states of mental functioning were not alleging a derangement of
habits, sentiments, or feelings. There was nothing “clear headed” about their criminality;
if anything, they were missing at their own crime, lending perhaps a very vivid image
to the term “absence”. And yet, the two types of mental distraction shared a feature that
would pose a continuing conundrum for Old Bailey juries: inexplicable, pointless, indeed
self-annihilating criminality. Moral insanity might serve as a plausible explanation in cases
where there had been no object to the crime at all. “I might as well shoot at her as anyone
else”, sighed Queen Victoria’s soi-disant assassin, which is hardly a cri de coeur from a
defendant likely to pay for his regicide with a state execution.22
When Criminality Becomes a Diagnosis
In an effort to examine how the late Victorian courts responded to seemingly purpose-
less criminality committed after the 1876 acquittal on the grounds of unconsciousness, an
examinationwasundertakenofalltrialsheardattheOldBaileyfrom1877to1913, theyear
that the Papers cease publication. The survey yielded a total of 478 trials in which some
form of mental derangement was put forward as part of the prisoner’s defence. Seventy-ﬁve
indicted persons were determined unﬁt to plead, leaving a total of 403 prisoners who even-
tually entered some form of insanity in their defence. Medical witnesses testiﬁed in almost
all of these trials, although it was still possible for a defendant in late Victorian England to
be declared insane with no asylum doctor, police surgeon, or general practitioner advising
the jury whatsoever. Indeed, it was possible for a jury to acquit on the grounds of insanity
or, after 1883, to ﬁnd a defendant “guilty, but insane” without the prisoner ever raising the
plea.23
To support their inference of mental derangement, medical witnesses invoked a broad
arrayofpsychologicalandmaterialagents, rangingfromhallucinationstohypochondriasis,
20 HM Adv. v. Fraser (l878), 4 Couper 78: 70–78.
21 The medical witness published his own review
of the trial and the grounds for inferring
unconsciousness. Dr Yellowlees, ‘Homicide by a
somnambulist’, J. Men. Sci., l878, 24: 451–8.
22 Joel P Eigen, ‘Sense and sensibility; arsenic and
insanity in nineteenth-century England’, in
R A Melikan, Maureen Mulholland, and Brian Pullan
(eds), The trial in history: politics, crime, and the
state 1699–1900, Manchester University Press, 2003,
pp. 21–35.
23 The wording of the insanity acquittal was the
subject of parliamentary action in 1883, prompted by
a request from the palace following a third
assassination attempt on the Queen. Since madmen
were likely to respond to the idée ﬁxe of their
delusion, the palace averred, could not the fear of
conviction also work on their mind? Although both
verdicts yielded the same disposition—indeﬁnite
detention awaiting the sovereign’s pleasure—a ﬁnding
of “guilty but insane” was conceived to function as a
deterrent, even for the deluded. For an analysis of the
political context in which the 1883 Act took hold, see
Joel P Eigen, “‘An inducement to morbid minds”:
politics and madness in the Victorian courtroom’, in
Markus D Dubber and Lindsay Farmer (eds), Modern
histories of crime and punishment, Stanford
University Press, 2007, pp. 66–87.
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Table 1
Medical terms cited in testimony (by trial)
Term Frequency
Delusion 96
Melancholia 46
Homicidal mania 43
Epilepsy 36
Melancholy 23
Hallucinations 13
Unconscious 12
Mania 12
Puerperal insanity 11
Brain disorder 6
coup de soleil to coma, paralytic stroke to paroxysm. Table 1 lists the most frequently
invoked terms mentioned in insanity trials by medical witnesses in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.24 As witnessed in the two periods that precede this sur-
vey (1760–1843 and 1844–1876), delusion continues to feature most prominently in Old
Bailey medical testimony bearing on mental derangement. Judges ask about it, defence
lawyers frame questions around it, and prisoners often mention it either in their statements
before the arraigning magistrate or at their trial. Melancholia, a term that had all but disap-
peared in courtroom testimony of the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century—although never
having fallen into desuetude in the popular culture—made a striking reappearance at the
Old Bailey.25 Together with mania, melancholia has enjoyed perhaps the longest vintage
in western conceptions of madness, dating to classical antiquity.26 Similarly, epilepsy and
puerperalinsanity,wellrepresentedinthislist,wereoftenheardincourtearlierinthecentury
as well.
24 Table 1 lists only the most frequently cited
terms; many others were mentioned by medical
witnesses, but as the focus of the present work is the
salience of key terms employed by
forensic-psychiatric witnesses as measured by the
frequency of their appearance, only those terms
mentioned six or more times were included. It should
also be noted that these terms were often mentioned in
connection with one another; delusion and
melancholia might appear together, melancholy and
puerperal insanity could similarly be described by the
same witness. The separation of melancholy (a
disposition) from melancholia (a disease entity)
follows the distinctions drawn in courtroom testimony.
Clearly it is possible that melancholy and melancholia
were used interchangeably by some witnesses, yet
they were usually treated separately in both medical
text and medical testimony. Further, there were cases
in which no causal agent was given; medical witnesses
merely characterized the prisoner as “depressed” or of
“unsound mind”.
25 In his effort to bring nineteenth-century
descriptive psychopathology in line with evolving
clinical, scientiﬁc medicine, Esquirol sought to free
mental derangement from traditional humoral
grounding. He retained melancholia’s association with
an idée ﬁxe, but replaced the spectre of a sorrowful
disposition with an expansive, indeed, explosive
temperament. The resulting term, monomanie,
featured instinctive and homicidal variants.
26 For a comprehensive historical analysis of
melancholia, both in medical and cultural context, see
Stanley W Jackson, Melancholia and depression:
from Hippocratic times to modern times, New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1986.
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There is one term, however, which came into prominence in this latest survey, that had
rarely been mentioned earlier at the Old Bailey and stood apart even from delusion and
melancholia in its relation to crime. By the early twentieth century, homicidal mania—
and its brethren, homicidal tendency and homicidal impulse—had surpassed puerperal
insanity, brain injuries, and epilepsy to rank only behind delusion and melancholia as the
most frequently cited grounds supporting a diagnosis of severe mental impairment. Where
it distinguished itself—even among the more familiarly invoked conditions—was in its
deﬁning, inevitable consequence. One could be delusional and end one’s days profoundly
yet harmlessly paranoid; one could descend into the depths of melancholia and sit year-by-
year simpering by the ﬁre contemplating suicide. Only homicidal mania had a necessary
objective:murder.Medicalmenwhocitedtheprisoninterviewasthebasisfortheirinference
of insanity did not have to look far to ground their diagnosis in the contemporary medical
literature.
One notes an intriguing connection between the medical text quoted most frequently
in courtroom testimony and the case material employed by its author to justify homicidal
mania’s niche in the jurisprudence of insanity. In its fourth edition already at the time of the
trials surveyed in this study, Alfred Swaine Taylor’s The principles and practice of medical
jurisprudence(1865)wasquotedverbatimbothbydefencelawyersposingquestionsandby
medical witnesses supplying the grounds for their diagnosis. Taylor’s totemic text outlined
the three forms homicidal mania could take: the propensity to kill related to an actual
delusion, an absurd motive to kill related to no known motive, or an impulse to kill that was
“sudden, instantaneous, unreﬂective, and uncontrollable”.27 Even when the author and his
work were not invoked by name, the adjectives just mentioned—recited in seriatim—could
be heard in court. In the 1902 trial of Amelia Wieland for the wilful murder of her daughter,
the medical witness concluded his direct testimony with “I agree that one of the degrees
of homicidal mania is where the impulse to kill is sudden, unresisting, unreﬂective, and
uncontrollable”.28
As useful as Taylor’s volume would prove to medical witnesses trying to argue the
case for homicidal mania in court, it is difﬁcult to see how Medical jurisprudence would
have taken shape—or continued to merit its numerous editions—without the day-to-
day trials at the Old Bailey. One discovers in his text not only the prominent cases of
Oxford, Hadﬁeld, and McNaughtan, but the somewhat less celebrated insanity trials of
deluded Robert Pate (1850), sleepwalker Sarah Minchin (1853), and housewife Ann Vyse
(1862), who mixed Battle’s Vermin Killer into the ingredients for her children’s rice
pudding.29 A conspicuous synergy existed therefore between medical text and medical
testimony, each supplying the other with legitimacy and illustration, in a reciprocal bond of
co-dependence.
When the medical witness in the Wieland trial employed Taylor’s construction of hom-
icidalmaniaasuncontrollableimpulse, neitherthenotionofoverwhelmingcompulsionnor
the idea of an unruly impulse was new to the Old Bailey. What was new—both in medical
testimonyandmedicalwriting—wastheparticularuseoftheterm, unreﬂective. Onewould
have thought that an impulse said to bypass the reﬂective powers of mind left little room
27 Taylor, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 1101–2.
28 OBSP, 1902–03, case 113, 2nd sess.,
pp. 228–33.
29 OBSP, l850, case 1300, 9th sess., pp. 374–88;
OBSP, 1852–53, case 725, 8th sess., 215–18; OBSP,
1861–62, case 745, 9th sess., pp. 300–13.
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for the possibility that delusion could ever play a role in homicidal mania.30 But even as
medical witnesses spoke in terms of “impulsive homicidal tendency”, almost half placed
delusion at the heart of this curious malady. In a critical move, the specialist witness was
articulating the vital component of delusion that, although never negotiated in court, would
invest the diagnosis with penetrating courtroom effect.
Delusion’s Unnamed Hook
When delusion was ﬁrst introduced to the English court in 1800 at the trial of James
Hadﬁeld—introduced, one might add, by a the defence lawyer, not a medical witness—it
wasclearthataprofoundfearoroverwhelmingpresentimentdidnotmerelylanguishinone’s
mind.Delusioncarriedapowerfulspurtoaction.Believingthatone’sexecutionatthehands
ofthestatewouldreplicatethedeathofJesusandtherebyusherintheSecondComingcom-
pelled the true believer to act.31 Mothers who feared that Satan would capture and kill their
children unless they killed them ﬁrst did not merely ponder this conviction. As juries in the
ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century learned, “nothing short of a physical impossibility would
preventhimfromperforminganyactwhichhisdelusionmightimpelhimtodo”.32 Delusive
beliefsandfearsdictatedbehaviouralactsthatbypassedtheactor’scapacitytochoose. That
the inevitable consequence of delusion was rarely mentioned in courtroom testimony is not
surprising. Determinisminanyform—whetherpsychologicalororganic—wasanathemato
thelaw’sbasisforascribingculpability: purposefullychosenbehaviour. Andyettheacquit-
tal of defendants described as delusional suggests the jury’s acknowledgement that circum-
scribederrorandtheconsequentbehaviouralspurhadplacedtheactbeyondthedefendant’s
volition. By grounding homicidal mania upon delusion, medical witnesses were creating a
familiar conceptual home for this most recent form of impulsive, unreﬂective insanity.
Even when not invoked by name, medical witnesses at the Old Bailey often included the
imagerycommonlyassociatedwithdelusion. Jurorslearnedthatasaformofcircumscribed
derangement, homicidal mania left the afﬂicted seemingly capable of conducting all other
features of their life, even as they were driven to crime. Imagery long associated with
overpowering fear and dread was therefore employed in court:
a power of darkness overshadowed him, the idea came to him that he had better kill the children, that
they may go to a better world ...not unfrequently persons in a ﬁt of homicidal mania will kill the
persons near and dear to them other than strangers.33
30 Contemporary scientiﬁc literature explained the
phenomenon of behaviour unattended by thought with
the concept of reﬂexes: the “ideo-motor principle of
action” put forward by Carpenter, who argued that an
idea could act directly on motor processes, bypassing
the mental processes of reﬂection and volition. See
William B Carpenter, The doctrine of human
automatism: a lecture, London, Sunday Lecture
Society, 1875, and Thomas Laycock, ‘Reﬂex,
automatic, and unconscious cerebration: a history and
a criticism’, J. Men. Sci., 1876, 21: 477–98. Popular
entertainments including music hall hypnotism and
salon mesmerism also demonstrated the possibility of
behaviour unattended by consciousness. For a
comprehensive history of these cultural diversions, see
Alison Winter, Mesmerized: powers of mind in
Victorian Britain, University of Chicago Press,
1998.
31 Defence attorneys could also enlist delusion as
the agent of the prisoner’s crime. In 18l2, a medical
witness stated, “the old delusion, acting on his mind,
will lead him to do any act”, OBSP, 18l2, case 527,
6th sess., p. 333.
32 OBSP, 1842–43, case 874, 5th sess., p. 761.
33 OBSP, l898, case 621, 11th sess., p. 1171.
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The association of delusion with a dark shadow on the mind dates to classical antiquity,
picked up by Renaissance medicine’s focus on the role of melancholic humours extruding
black adust in the brain, and continuing into the trial of Daniel McNaughtan: “I mean
that black spot on his mind.”34 Overshadowing darkness had found a new home in the late
Victorian insanity trial: this time, in homicidal mania.35
ItfelltoHenryCharltonBastian,physiciantotheHospitalfortheParalyzedandEpileptic,
to supply the most comprehensive courtroom explanation of homicidal mania when asked
by a judge to give his medical opinion of what lay behind the illogical crime.
A man having certain tendencies will occasionally without warning or provocation, commit a certain
act of violence, sometimes suicidal, sometimes homicidal; something comes over him abruptly ...
leadinghimtocommitsomeactofviolence, hebeingabsolutelyunconsciousoftheact; hemayknow
what it is, but not the quality of it. [A] gust of impulse comes over him so suddenly that he is not in a
position to weigh or balance whether such a thing is right or wrong ... 36
The doctor’s effort to distinguish the prisoner’s capacity to know the nature but not the
quality of the act—that it was legally wrong but not morally wrong—drew the conceptual
world of homicidal mania and delusion even closer. James Hadﬁeld’s delusion that he must
sacriﬁce himself by killing George III meant that the defendant was fully mindful that his
act was legally proscribed—indeed he chose it because it would ensure his execution—but
thatthedelusionregardinghissavingmankindbyhisownexecutionlefthimoblivioustoits
moral transgression. Given such profound confusion, could his act be described as wilful,
as chosen? Deluded people were fully capable of describing the events surrounding their
offence, but, given a fateful misreading of the consequences of their behaviour, they were
incapable of appreciating what was wrong about the act.
After Dr Bastian gave his expansive deﬁnition of homicidal mania, he was asked poin-
tedly: “Howwoulditbeconsistentwiththeprisoner’snotbeingconsciousoftheactthatthe
man, an hour afterwards, would say to the surgeon at the hospital, ‘Have I ﬁnished the job?
Is she dead? If not, I am sorry for it’.” The medical witness acknowledged the difﬁculty of
the question, and answered in the following, admittedly equivocal, way:
[W]e don’t know the workings of his mind at the time—that sort of thing occurs again and again in
these homicidal acts. It may be some sudden thought that compels him irresistibly ...for some time
the notion may linger in his mind—the only question is whether the notion is a thing generated in his
sane mind or in the mind of a man who is insane—I feel the difﬁculty fully; and I can go no further
than saying, “It is possible”; I cannot afﬁrm it more distinctly.
That Bastian had been asked by the Treasury to visit the prisoner in his cell and was in court
to serve as the Crown’s rebuttal witness to the defence case may have contributed to his
reluctance to pronounce unambiguously on the prisoner’s state of mind. Still, his testimony
suppliedthejurywiththeconnectionbetweendiagnosisandbehaviour, afﬁrmedbyanother
witness for the prosecution, the medical ofﬁcer of Holloway: “I agree with Dr Bastian that
34 OBSP, 1842–43, case 874, 5th sess., p. 763.
35 “Overshadowing darkness” would return later in
the century during the trial of Mary Ann Brough, to be
discussed shortly. Brough’s trial was among the ﬁrst
to enlist homicidal mania as the grounds for an
insanity defence.
36 OBSP, 1895–96, case 504, 9th sess., p. 881.
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it is possible that the man may have suffered from a sudden attack of homicidal mania at
the time the act was committed.”37
If one reads Bastian’s comments carefully, it is possible to see how impulsive, even
irresistiblecriminalitywasbeingplacedatthedoorstepofanotionlingeringintheaccused’s
mind. This was the essence of delusional insanity, further underscoring how much had
changed with the introduction of delusion as the ﬁrst substantive challenge to a total want
ofmemoryandunderstandingastherequisitecriterionforacquittal. Defendantswhoraised
an insanity plea in the 1700s had been depicted as delirious, insensible, “being out of one’s
wits”—a degree of distraction almost mandated by the reigning legal criterion articulated
in “wild beast” imagery since the Arnold case in 1725.38 With the successful introduction
of a partial state of derangement at the Hadﬁeld trial (1800), medical testimony afﬁrmed
the capacity of the delusional to execute a range of tasks on the day of the crime, revealing
nothing even to their intimates.
In time, the capacity to function within a circumscribed mental world was extended to
homicidal mania. Testifying in 1879, a physician asserted: “I do not think that the making
of arrangements or the disposition of property ...is inconsistent with the fact of a person
suffering from homicidal mania”, adding, perhaps a bit provocatively, “a person who is
insane is not deprived of mind”.39 Expert witnesses often picked up on this theme, stressing
the “great deliberation and cunning” that would attend the act of the homicidal maniac.
Although such testimony veered perilously close to premeditation and hence to the law’s
centraltenetofintention—whattheactormeanttodo, whathechosetodo—juriesappeared
willingtoconsiderthepossibilitythatseeminglypurposefulbehaviourcouldbeunattended
by conscious choice owing to an overwhelming homicidal impulse animated by a delusion.
Again, the notion of an all-powerful impulse propelling the accused into an outrageous
act of violence was not new to the court, but it had yet to ﬁnd receptive ears among judges
or juries. Unlike the earlier species of moral insanity deﬁned by deﬁciencies of volitional
controlevenastheaccusedhadbeenfullyawareofthenatureofhiscrime, homicidalmania
managed to engage the law’s central concern with knowing right from wrong by framing
the mania as the impulsive response to a delusory fear: a “shadow” on the mind. This was
not mere mania that might lead to aggression or brutality; it was a propensity to kill: as
Taylor had written, “an impulse to kill”.40 Still, a judge had only to ask the medical witness
how he would distinguish an irresistible from an unresisted (homicidal) impulse, as he
was wont do to when confronted with expert testimony featuring uncontrollable impulses.
“What does criminality imply, but that passion has got the mastery of reason—that the
importunity of temptation is too clamorous to allow the voice of reason to be heard. What
is this but the subjugation of reason to vice?”41 Although homicidal mania accompanied
by delusion met no discernible hostility on the part of the judiciary, not all defendants
could avail themselves of the law’s chosen mental impairment. When it was not on offer,
37 Ibid., p. 882.
38 For lay images transported to the courtroom, see
Eigen, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 82–105.
39 OBSP, 1879–80, case 428, 7th sess., p. 103.
40 This language was picked up in criminal trials
as well: “a tendency ...to child murder” (OBSP,
1879–80, case 428, 7th sess., p. 101; an
“uncontrollable impulse to kill” (OBSP, 1887–88,
case 407, 6th sess., p. 800); “impulse to take a life”
(OBSP, 1900–1, case 142, 3rd sess., p. 199; OBSP,
1910, case 366, July, p. 378).
41 ‘Baron Rolfe’s charge to the jury in the case of
boy Allnutt, who was tried at the central criminal
court for the murder of his grandfather, on the 15th of
December, 1847’, J. Psych. Med. Men. Path., 1848, 1:
193–216.
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courtroom testimony reveals an attempt to couple homicidal mania with another malady,
already associated with autonomous forces that could carry the afﬂicted “quite away”.
A Convulsion of Ideas
Then something seemed to snap in my head and I jumped up and caught her by the throat.... I felt
as if I was holding a very strong galvanic battery ...I wanted to leave go and I could not. When I did
leave go she fell. I realised almost in a moment what I had done.... I held a mirror to her mouth to
see if she was breathing, and she was not.42
Although it was not unusual for eighteenth-century insanity defendants to offer a
Prisoner’s Defence at their trial, the construction of a comprehensive role for the defence
lawyer after the Prisoner’s Counsel Act of 1836 usually meant that future allegedly mad
prisoners would be silent during their trial.43 William Philpot, however, would prove the
exception, beginning his defence with the above graphic description of the killing. He was
followed in the witness box by a police surgeon, who spoke to the prisoner’s state of mind
when he checked to see if his wife was breathing after the brutal attack. “One of the char-
acteristics of a person who is subject to such ﬁts when the ﬁt is not on is to be perfectly
rational. After a ﬁt they usually go to sleep, and on waking appear quite normal.” The type
of ﬁt the prisoner was subject to, the police surgeon explained, was epilepsy. But it was a
novel form of this long-familiar disease that jurors were to learn about from Sidney Dyer,
Medical Ofﬁcer at Brixton:
Persons having epileptic tendencies may discharge the ordinary duties of life quite normally for
years without the brain showing any weakness of the kind, and when subject to attack give way to
uncontrolled fury. When the attack has passed over they appear quite cool and collected. This is
called epileptic automatism.... I found no epileptic tendencies in the prisoner, though he was closely
watched. Itwouldbepossibleforhim, however, nottobetraythem. Ofallclassesofweaknessmasked
epilepsy is the one form which is so often concealed in a person.44
There was certainly nothing novel in drawing epilepsy into insanity’s orbit or in coupling
it with automatism; this had already been effected in 1876 during the prosecution of the
mother who fatally injured her infant in a state of epileptic vertigo. What was noteworthy
in Dr Dyer’s testimony was his use of “masked epilepsy”, which by the early twentieth
century was increasingly associated with homicidal mania. First articulated in France in an
effort to parcel out states of epileptiform disorders in terms of degree of impairment, this
“silent”formofthedisease,capableofgeneratingviolentlyassaultivebehaviour,wasnamed
l’épilepsielarvéebyBénédict-AugustinMorelandJean-FrançoisFalret. Masked, orlarval,
epilepsyhadattractedtheattentionoftheoristsandcliniciansbecauseofitswidelybelieved
connection to murderous fury. Described as sudden, without motive, and noteworthy for
42 OBSP, 1912, Jan., p. 577.
43 Defence attorneys were only given a scope of
advocacy that we normally associate with this role
today—addressing the jury, summing up evidence,
actually pleading a defence—with the Trial for
Felonies Act of 1836, commonly referred to as the
Prisoner’s Counsel Act. Before this, defence attorneys
were routinely restricted to questioning witnesses.
After 1836, they were afforded access to pre-trial
testimony and were free to “nourish growth in the law
of evidence”. For a comprehensive history of the
evolving role of the defence attorney, see David
Cairns, Advocacy and the making of the adversarial
criminal trial, 1800–1865, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1998.
44 OBSP, 1912, Jan., p. 576.
445Joel Peter Eigen
its ferocity, the fatal assault of the (masked) epileptic was committed in plain sight with no
attempt to hide or elude detection.45
In England, masked epilepsy could not have found a more inﬂuential voice than that of
Henry Maudsley, editor of theJournal of Mental Sciencefrom 1860 to 1878, and a frequent
witness at the Old Bailey. Unambiguously claiming his intention “to group the reported
cases of homicidal mania to exhibit the relations of them as morbid states of the nervous
system”, Maudsley found in masked epilepsy both an organic grounding for involuntary
behaviour and a ready explanation for why those afﬂicted had never revealed the traditional
motordisturbancesassociatedwithepilepsypriortothecrime. Epilepsyhadbeenhidden—
masked—by the seemingly normal functioning of the prisoner up to the moment when a
“convulsion of ideas” took hold, propelling the afﬂicted into murderous assault.46
Formsofmaskedepilepsyvaried. Insomepatients“thecharacterofthediseasechanged;
instead of epileptic attacks the afﬂicted was seized with an irresistible impulse to commit
murder”.47 In other cases, epileptic seizures produced criminal assault from their inception.
In the witness box, medical witnesses explained that the prisoner’s particular form of epi-
lepsy had substituted crime for convulsion: “in place of the ﬁt, there is an overwhelming
anxiety to commit a crime”, or “it is a disease in which the fact of epilepsy is replaced by
an impulse to do some outrageous homicidal act”.48 One divisional police surgeon distin-
guished masked epilepsy by explaining: “In masked epilepsy, there is not the frothing at
the mouth or the twitching of arms or limbs.”49 Two years later, a prison medical ofﬁcer
continued in this vein: “there is no outward sign, there is no convulsion or apparent loss of
consciousness—thepatientdoesnotfalldown”.50 Undetectedbyeventhepatient’sintimate
associatesandsometimesevenunnoticedbytheafﬂictedthemselves,personssufferingfrom
masked epilepsy could ﬁnd themselves the accidental offender in a crime that remained as
much a mystery to them as it did to the jury. Such was the tragic tale of Ernest Partridge
in 19l0.
Standingoverhisdeadwife, theprisonerhadrealizedtohishorrorwhathadimmediately
transpired. A medical man who had been called to the crime scene informed the jury of his
conversation with the prisoner.
He then said that he remembered absolutely nothing else until he heard a knock and the shout “Milk.
3d. a quart.” He then suddenly came to himself, and discovered that ...his wife ...was dead with
her throat cut. He became very excited ...and said to me, “Doctor, if that milkman had only shouted
‘Milk, 3d. a quart’ one minute before my dear wife’s life would have been saved,” which I considered
very strong evidence of the unconsciousness of his act.
That Ernest Partridge remembered nothing of the killing conﬁrmed the prison doctor’s
diagnosis. “This attack which he had is called ‘masked epilepsy’ ... his acts are
45 Dr Ardin-Delteil, ‘L’épilepsie larvée’, Le
Progrès Méd., 29 Dec. 1900, 3rd série, no. 52, p. 495.
The lack of stealth—both in committing the crime and
in the conspicuous indifference to detection—reminds
the medical historian of the criminal activity attributed
to the morally insane. In both cases, there is a
perplexing purposelessness to the fatal action that
challenged the law’s central tenet of culpability:
intentional behaviour.
46 Henry Maudsley, Responsibility in mental
disease, London, Henry S King, 1874, p. 166.
47 Ibid., p. 334.
48 OBSP, 1894–95, case 814, 12th sess., p. 1119;
OBSP, 1893–94, case 612, 10th sess., p. 860.
49 OBSP, 1891–92, case 225, 3rd sess., p. 415.
50 OBSP, 1893–94, case 612, 10th sess., p. 860.
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automatic ... on regaining consciousness ...[he] does not remember the things that have
happened”. Questioned by the judge to explain the form his disease had taken, the witness
replied, “Sometimes ...instead of the ﬁt coming on they will get homicidally maniacal ...
[f]rom a criminal point of view these are the worst cases.”51 On rare occasions, the con-
nection between this hidden epilepsy and murderous fury could be made explicitly, “this is
a case of impulsive homicidal mania, from masked epilepsy”.52 Most often, however, the
two terms were simply drawn into close proximity; it was not the relationship they bore to
oneanotherbuttheirjointappearancethatconstitutedthereasonsforthemedicalinference.
“Absence of recollection”, “absence of motive”, and “evidence of epilepsy in the family”
were all cited as grounds for the inference of homicidal mania, although one suspects that
absenceofmotiveweighedheaviestforthediagnosis: “Idonotthinkamanwouldhaveany
intelligible motive for killing his brother, unless he was insane, or a very great criminal”.53
Although medical witnesses at the Old Bailey had long grown accustomed to giving
the reasons for their diagnosis—the “timing and placement of the crime, the demeanour
following, the lack of recollection”—they usually stepped gingerly around the implications
of impaired volition for the court’s business of assigning criminal responsibility.54 No such
reticence inhibited medical authors. Writing in the Journal of Mental Science some twenty
yearsbeforetheﬁrstmentionofmaskedepilepsyincourt, aDrThorneThorneofStBartho-
lomew’s unequivocally afﬁrmed: “Volition is in abeyance, and hence responsibility must
be so also.”55 The question of human agency, however, was never far from courtroom testi-
monyregardingmaskedepilepsy, orhomicidalmaniaforthatmatter. Convulsivebehaviour
commonly associated with epilepsy had long been conceptualized as patently involuntary,
just as the impelling force of an overwhelming delusion could be conceived as having
removed the prisoner’s will. McNaughtan’s own delusion of political persecution after all
had supplied the London reading public with trenchant images of what it was like to be in
the hapless throes of an all-consuming idée ﬁxe. The source of aggression was clearly the
delusion. For those cases of homicidal mania that were short of either delusion or masked
epilepsy, there still remained its resemblance to another, very speciﬁc form of impulsive
behaviour that had found success in the London courtroom.
OldBaileyjurieshadlongbeenwillingtoconsidertheexculpatorypotentialofadefence
baseduponthementalupheavalfollowingchildbirthaswellasrelateddisturbancesowingto
51 OBSP, 1910–11, case 251, May, p. 255.
52 OBSP, 1893–94, case 612, 10th sess., p. 860.
53 Ibid.
54 Medical witnesses could show exquisite
sensitivity to the implications of their testimony, even
when asked directly to comment on the prisoner’s
responsibility for the act. These questions could
sometimes be rather indirect, but on other occasions
reveal point-blank inquiry, as in the trial of Edward
Oxford (1840) when the judge asked, “What is the
limit of responsibility a medical man would draw?”
With obvious deference to the legal forum, the
medical man responded, “This is a very difﬁcult
point—it is scarcely a medical question ...it is very
difﬁcult to draw the line between eccentricity and
insanity.” (OBSP, 1840, case 1877, 9th sess., p. 505).
55 Thorne Thorne, ‘Masked epilepsy’, J. Men. Sci.,
Jan. 187l, 16: 580–4, p. 583. Other voices in the
medical community could be no less adamant.
According to the French clinician Falret, the epileptic
who, in a state of post-ictal delirium, attempted or
committed suicide, homicide, or arson, “had not the
slightest responsibility for ‘violent acts committed by
him in the midst of this completely automatic, though
short delirium”’, “‘they strike mechanically, without
motivations, without interest, without knowing what
they do or, at least, with a vague consciousness of
their actions’,” quoted in Oswei Temkin, The falling
sickness: a history of epilepsy from the Greeks to the
beginnings of modern neurology’, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1971, p. 321.
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reproductivebiology. Thatbelovedinfantscouldbekilledinasuddenburstofemotioneven
as the mother remained conscious had long been argued in court and in print.56 Although
commonly associated with violent, unaccountable outbursts of homicidal fury, medical
opinionregardingpuerperalinsanityoftenresteduponthepresenceofdelusioninthetragic
assault upon an infant. This association with circumscribed intellectual derangement has
immediate relevance for present purposes: when puerperal mania (and other reproductively
based disturbance) was combined with delusion, the prisoner was likely to be described in
court as suffering from homicidal mania. “I should certainly conclude that the absence of
concealmentofhavingdonethedeedwasanindicationofhomicidalmania. ...[shehad]...
many delusions ...that her milk was turned to water.”57 Although criminal defences based
on a range of reproductive ills did not ensure an acquittal, courtroom questioning reveals
that defences based upon physiological upheaval were taken seriously and, one suspects,
provided support for considering homicidal mania as another of Maudsley’s “morbid states
of the nervous system”.
Framing insanity as a disorder of the nervous system carried obvious implications for
retaining a belief in an autonomous will, already under critical scrutiny in light of emerging
biological research on reﬂex action. These studies conceived of the organism’s behaviour
as serving its own physiological needs, a conviction that threatened a formal break with
mind–body interaction that had supplied previous generations with a model of behavioural
organization. Reﬂex action was patently automatic, carrying an “in-built purposesiveness
[that] functioned in terms of the law of organismic self-conservation”.58 With the implicit
removal of the will and consciousness as things—although still sometimes present as prop-
erties of physiological organization—Thomas Laycock and William B Carpenter provided
anewgenerationofasylumphysiciansandpolicesurgeonswithamodelofhumanfunction-
ing that not only relegated mental elements to the status of epiphenomena of physiological
processes, but also provided forensic-psychiatric witnesses with a compelling conception
of behaviour unattended by “mental elements” such as intentionality.
The law, however, is based on just such intentional mental elements.59 It is the pris-
oner’s conscious resolve—his will to harm—that confers culpability to action. Growing
interest in reﬂex theory meant that the common law’s conception of psychological man
was increasingly spinning away from popular and scientiﬁc conceptions of what lay behind
human behaviour. Sleepwalking and theatrical demonstrations of hypnotic trance revealed
choreographed actions displaying no apparent consciousness or will. At the Old Bailey,
56 Shelley Day, ‘Puerperal insanity: the historical
sociology of a disease’, PhD thesis, University of
Cambridge, 1985; George K Behlmer, ‘Deadly
motherhood: infanticide and medical opinion in
mid-Victorian England’, J. Hist. Med. Allied Sci.,
1979, 34: 403–27; Mark Jackson, “‘Suspicious infant
deaths”: the statute of 1624 and medical evidence at
coroners’ inquests’, in Clark and Crawford (eds),
op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 64–86. Most recently Hilary
Marland has considered the incidence of cases of
puerperal insanity in asylum admissions in “‘Destined
to a perfect recovery”: the conﬁnement of puerperal
insanity in the nineteenth century’, in J Melling and
B Forsythe (eds), Insanity, institutions and society,
1800–1914: a social history of madness in
comparative perspective, Routledge, 1999,
pp. 137–56.
57 OBSP, 1856–57, case 480, 6th sess., pp. 722–3.
58 Karl Danziger, ‘Mid-nineteenth-century British
psychophysiology: a neglected chapter in the history
of psychology’, in William R Woodward and Mitchell
G Ash (eds), The problematic science: psychology in
nineteenth-century thought, New York, Praeger, 1982,
pp. 119–46.
59 Roger Smith, Trial by medicine: insanity and
responsibility in Victorian trials, Edinburgh
University Press, 1981, pp. 52–3.
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jurors learned of further dramatic episodes of otherness, manifested in automatism and in
states of epileptic vertigo suggesting mysterious displays of unconscious though purposive
action. Judges responded soberly and in temperate tones to medical assertions that such
behaviour was unattended by consciousness, with the clear implication that the actor stood
beyond the purposes of law in terms of ascribing culpability for harm done. For their part,
juries appeared perfectly willing to consider the distance that separated act from actor.
Cases involving suspended consciousness, however, were not numerous. Judicial equan-
imitymaywellhavebeenconditionedbytheinfrequencyofdefencesengagingdissociation,
and perhaps by their mesmerizing theatricality as well. These events were framed as excep-
tionalstatesof“absence”orofhaving“gonemissing”; theywerenotdiscussedintherealm
of impulses. Acquitting defendants for offences committed in unconscious states of being
did not therefore threaten to undermine the law’s investment in intention and purposeful
resolve as the deﬁning elements of responsibility.
The (New) Professional Gaze
The court’s willingness to entertain medical testimony featuring uncontrollable impulses
in the form of homicidal mania can also be explained by the background of the medical
witnesses who were transporting the new disease entity into the Old Bailey. The years that
had witnessed the introduction of delusion as the most frequently invoked medico-legal
concept at the Old Bailey (1800–43) and the controversy over moral insanity and irresist-
ible impulse (1844–76) had also seen the predominance of asylum physicians and general
practitioners in the courtroom.60 The ﬁrst “mad-doctors” in court were often neighbours
of the accused who happened to witness behaviour or who engaged in conversations that
had taken an unexpected detour into delirious speech or frightening histrionics. These early
forensic-psychiatric witnesses were likely to be employed in the (private) lunacy trade as
medical attendants in large asylums, or as gaol surgeons requested by the Corporation of
the City of London to visit prisoners likely to raise an insanity plea. Authors of medical
texts also appeared in court, several having had no contact at all with the prisoner.61
In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, the most frequently appearing witness was the
Newgate surgeon, Gilbert McMurdo, who almost always found the prisoner to be sane,
sometimes in cases of such patently conspicuous madness that his testimony was risibly
absurd.62 In the decades immediately following McNaughtan, it was the asylum doctors
whose voluble presence was most noteworthy, taking issue speciﬁcally with questions that
60 For a survey of pre-trial associations between
medical men and prisoners before 1843, see Eigen,
op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 120–32.
61 Forbes Winslow, testifying at the McNaughtan
trial, is perhaps the best example of this. Winslow
makes repeated appearances at the Old Bailey,
often visiting prisoners prior to the trial. Another
author, Arthur Luff, referred to a book of his while
testifying (not named, but likely to be his Text-book
of forensic medicine and toxicology, London,
Longmans, Green, 1895) as well as his visit to
prisoners in their cells, giving both as the grounds
for his courtroom opinion. Luff’s volume is
also referred to by prison doctors in their
testimony.
62 With adamantine insistence, McMurdo
famously refused to ﬁnd anything aberrant in the
account of the ship’s captain, Noah Pease Folger, who,
at the mention of his supposed enemy’s name, stripped
off his clothes, broke windowpanes with his bare ﬁsts,
danced a jig on the broken glass, and completed the
display by jumping bareback on a passing whale.
Denying the existence of “any symptom which he has
exhibited to make me come to the conclusion of his
being of unsound mind”, McMurdo’s opinion stood
alone. OBSP, 1833, case 815, 4th sess., p. 402.
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Table 2
Professional afﬁliations
Place of employment Surgeon Physician “Medical Professional”
Prison 2 15
Gaol 4
Police 8
Asylum 3
Hospital 1 6
“Lecturer” 1
Private practice 4 3
None speciﬁed 3
precluded witnesses from venturing into the territory of volitional impairment, exclusive
of delusion.63 Gaol surgeons continued to ﬁnd prisoners sane; privately retained asylum
doctorsandgeneralpractitionerswerelikelytodivinesubstantialmentalimpairment. Inthe
latterpartofthenineteenthcentury,however,oneseesashiftintheprofessionalbackground
of the medical witnesses and the venues that served to bring together the prisoner and the
medical man. Table 2 provides data on the ﬁfty courtroom appearances of the medical
witnesses who appeared in the forty-three trials that featured testimony on homicidal mania
and masked epilepsy.
When homicidal mania and masked epilepsy were introduced to the Old Bailey, it was
not the asylum superintendent or the specialist in mental medicine but the prison doctor and
policesurgeonwhoweremostlikelytoargueitspresence.Whetheritwastheirunambiguous
afﬁliation with the Crown or their long familiarity with the Old Bailey—many of these
men had testiﬁed in multiple trials during these years—their appearance in court sparked
neither a sharp rebuke by the judge nor hostile questioning from the prosecuting lawyer.
Further, although divisional surgeons and prison medical ofﬁcers had been directed to see
thedefendantfortheexpresspurposeofgivingtestimonyincourt, theywerejustaslikelyto
afﬁrm the presence of insanity as to deny it. Clearly, medical men had found a professional
voice independent of their employer, and this was also true of physicians and surgeons
privately retained by the defence.
Directlyassociatedwiththeshiftinprofessionalbackgroundistheforumthatintroduced
the prisoner to the eventual witness. By the end of the nineteenth century, the two most
frequent associations grew out of the prisoner’s encounter either with the police surgeon,
called to the scene of a crime to determine the extent of the victim’s injuries and happening
to observe the assailant displaying signs of emotional aberrancy, or in an interview with the
prison’s medical ofﬁcer or an established London physician, requested by the Treasury to
speakwiththedefendant.Indeed,theprisoninterviewwasfastreplacingallotherforumsfor
63 Responding to the prosecuting attorney’s
insistence that he address the prisoner’s intellectual
capacities, John Conolly replied testily, “I am
perfectly aware that is the question.” The judge
interrupted, “If that is the question, it can surely be
answered?” to which the medical witness answered,
“I do not think it can absolutely be answered: I think it
can only be answered in the manner in which I have
answered it.” The doctor’s preferred focus was the
prisoner’s “power of controlling or resisting a train of
thought tending to criminal actions”. OBSP, 1850–51,
case 1502, 9th sess., pp. 368–9.
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the initial contact between prisoner and medical man. Although it is also true that Surgeon
McMurdo of Newgate had frequently appeared in insanity trials earlier in the century, he
had no particular expertise in mental medicine. His biography in the Royal College of
Surgeonslistsanexpertiseasophthalmology, butnomentionofhisemploymentassurgeon
to Newgate.
In McMurdo’s place, the latter years of the century witnessed prison medical ofﬁcers
who not only displayed a curiosity about the derangement that often led to a discovery of
insanity, butwhotransportedahostofnewdiagnosesintothecourtaswell. Tobesure, they
were not the only purveyors of new terms. Henry Maudsley, Forbes Winslow, and Henry
Charlton Bastian, whose institutional base was a general, not a mental, hospital, were also
on hand. The suspicion that attended an early-nineteenth-century mad doctor “trying to get
someone off on insanity” did not greet the medical men who proffered the existence of
homicidal mania in the late nineteenth century.64
A Mania to Diagnose
The opportunity to track and quantify the emergence of an innovative diagnosis in
courtroom testimony understandably tempts the medical historian to suggest the arrival
of a pivotal moment in the evolution of forensic psychiatry. A parallel temptation lurks in
theopportunitytocomputeacquittalratesininsanitytrials, presumedtorevealtheinﬂuence
of expert testimony on the jury. Vivid as they may appear, jury decisions displayed in the
aggregate promise rather more than they deliver. One would be hard pressed to explain any
oneverdictbytheintroductionofanovelmedicaltermortheparticipationofspecialistwit-
nesses.Thenasnow,verdictsaredrivenbyarangeoffactorslikelytoeludethemostdogged
of detectives. Even if the full range of forces behind a particular acquittal was ultimately
retrievable, one needs to remember that the legal signiﬁcance behind the jury’s ﬁnding
was shifting as well; the criterion for a successful plea changed qualitatively from “total
insanity” in the late 1700s to a range of partial insanities that gained exculpatory potential
by the mid-1800s. Clearly, changes in insanity’s meaning provide the critical context for
examining any quantitative change in acquittal or medical participation rates.
The same caveat regarding context applies to the hazards of quantifying diagnostic
terms that emerge in medical testimony. “To the great despair of historians,” Marc Bloch
trenchantly observed, “men fail to change their vocabulary each time they change their cus-
toms.”65 Itwasthecustomofmedicalwitnessesfromthe1850sonwardtoemployhomicidal
mania to typify the explosion of sudden, uncontrollable, and unreﬂective impulses. But the
forces believed to animate the fateful outbursts changed materially over the course of the
century. Originally depicted as irresistible, autonomous impulses stemming from unknown
origins and ﬁnding singular expression in murderous assault, these mysterious forces had,
by the early 1900s, found an altogether more knowable home in delusion—a thoroughly
64 For an overview of judicial attitudes, which
sometimes could ﬁnd sharp expression—“Haven’t
you been here before, as a Jew physician, trying to get
someone off on insanity?”—see Eigen, op. cit., note 4
above, pp. 55–7. The foregoing sentiment was
anomalous; with the exception of insanity defences
based on moral insanity, judicial posture regarding
insanity was, on balance, traditionally more solicitous
than contemptuous.
65 Marc Bloch, The historian’s craft, transl. Peter
Putnam, New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1953, p. 34.
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familiarforensicphenomenon—orinanovelformofepilepsy,astapleofnineteenth-century
courtroom testimony. Initially dismissed as a diagnosis suspicious at best and “dangerous”
at worst—“Gentlemen, such a thing as a person not being able to control himself in the
doing of an act which he knows to be wrong is a phrase that is not known to the law of
this country”—homicidal mania eventually enjoyed temperate, solicitous inquiry as it grew
to prominence in late Victorian courts.66 Although the term stayed familiar, the context in
which it was invoked shifted qualitatively.
The gentlemen addressed in the quotation above were members of a jury charged with
determining the fate of defendants such as Mary Ann Brough, who faced trial in 1856 for
slitting the throats of her six children. Prior judicial opinion that a “knowing but uncon-
trollable impulse was unknown to the common law” played a central role in the judge’s
instructionstothejury. Accordingtomostmembersofthemid-Victorianbench, aninsanity
of affect, of defective emotional control, of an inability to restrain an impulse the defendant
knew to be wrong was categorically beyond the common law’s meaning of insanity. The
judge’s instructions in the Brough trial were made in response to the testimony of Forbes
Winslow, a prominent author and well-known London medical man, who had described
the defendant’s mental impairment as “a combination of suicidal and homicidal mania, fre-
quently combined, both arising from a disordered brain”. Although Winslow spoke only in
terms of a homicidal (not an uncontrollable) impulse—a point underscored by the Lancet
in its review of the case—the trial judge rejected the notion of an uncontrollable impulse
tout court. This was, the judge averred, “a most dangerous doctrine, for undoubtedly every
crime is committed under some impulse and the object of law was to control impulses of
that description and thus prevent crime”.67
In response to the public controversy that followed the mother’s acquittal, James
Fitzjames Stephen sought to clarify the role of the jury in future insanity trials. Speak-
ing to the Juridical Society in 1858, the noted jurist acknowledged—without derision—the
possibilityofanuncontrollableimpulse, butshiftedthejury’sattentionawayfromthechar-
acteristics of any particular disease to the events surrounding the particular crime: “Guilt
turns upon the wilfulness of the act, and not upon the sanity of the prisoner.”68 It is import-
ant to see Stephen’s formulation not as some juristic sleight of hand; he is not consigning
the prisoner’s psychological state to tertiary signiﬁcance but rather insisting that whatever
the purported impairment in cognitive, or indeed, emotional faculty, the court’s business
was to consider the prisoner’s actual behaviour in committing the alleged act. Stephen is
underscoring the law’s foundational investment in mens rea: what the actor thought he
was doing at the time. Medical testimony proffering hypothesized mental states could cer-
tainly inform this inquiry, but diagnoses in themselves were not dispositive. Uncontrollable
impulses may exist (in theory), but the jury in a particular case must determine the pris-
oner’s culpability by focusing upon his or her actions at the time of the crime. Given the
events of the day, was it likely the accused acted with intention: was the behaviour wilfully
chosen?
66 Smith, op. cit., note 59 above, p. 111.
67 Roger Smith, ‘Deﬁning murder and madness; an
introduction to medicolegal belief in the case of Mary
Ann Brough’, in R A Jones and H Kulick (eds),
Knowledge and society: studies in the sociology of
culture past and present, 4 vols, Greenwich, CT, JAI
Press, 1983, vol. 4, pp. 173–225, on p. 197.
68 Ibid., p. 209.
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Almost half of the medical witnesses in subsequent trials answered Stephen’s question
by invoking the defendant’s delusion. Although one might think that only with difﬁ-
culty could a prisoner be described as clear thinking and delusional, prisoners pleading
a delusional insanity from 1800 had argued, often successfully, that at the time of the
crime their behaviour had been placed beyond their control. Trial testimony suggested an
involuntary action: an impelling, insistent spur to (criminal) action dictated by delusory
belief. What did it mean to ‘know’ the nature and quality of one’s acts when delusory
fear impelled action? It was more than a little disingenuous, therefore, for the judge to
state with such apodictic insistence that an uncontrollable act knowingly committed was
“unknown”tothelawofthecountry.IthadbeenknownattheOldBaileyformorethanhalfa
century.
No one had to articulate epilepsy’s involuntary features: does anyone choose to foam
at the mouth and collapse in a convulsive seizure? Epilepsy’s entrance into courtroom
testimony did not have to wait for its masked variation in the 1890s or even its vertiginous
form in 1876. Apoplectic and epileptic ﬁts had played a role in insanity trials since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, although they were more likely to be invoked by
neighbours, lovers, and co-workers than medical specialists.69 This easy elision of epilepsy
withinsanitywouldcomeunderclosescrutinyoncelarge-scaleasylumresearch,undertaken
in the second half of the 1800s, led to the conclusion that the incidence of mental problems
amongtheepilepticpopulationwasverysmall.70 Theconceptualseparationofepilepsyfrom
insanity helped to shift the study of epilepsy away from psychiatry and into neurology’s
preserve, a development that gained strength over the course of the later 1800s. Not all
psychiatrists, however, were willing to surrender epilepsy to the neurologist. With the
conceptualsubstitutionofmentalimpulsionforgrossmotordisturbance,medicalmenatthe
OldBailey(andinprint)invokeduniqueprofessionalexperiencetoprofferexplanationsfor
sudden, often inexplicable homicidal assault. When judges and juries were confronted with
this novel substitution for the familiar behavioural histrionics, courtroom inquiry focused
upon the nature and features of masked epilepsy, not its preposterousness. The Old Bailey
was inquisitive, not dismissive.
For the historian of law and medicine, this was a signature moment: “loss of control”
had arrived on a forensic-psychiatric footing that met neither judicial suspicion nor deri-
sion. With the Victorians’ increasing proclivity to cast all questions of human conduct in
physiological terms, two of the most vexing forms of social pathology—criminality and
mental derangement—were conceived as the fearful triumph of impulses over weakened
volition. The organism’s sovereignty over such untoward emotional and physical urges had
been achieved through the process of inhibition, acting both as a physiological mechanism
mediatingamongimpulsesandasaculturalforce,suppressinguntowardasocialimpulses.71
When the powers of inhibition were barred by organic alterations in the brain, however, the
organism—and by extension, the social fabric—was left prey to brutish, violent, impetuous
impulses.
69 Eigen, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 82–107.
70 G E Berrios, ‘Epilepsy and insanity during the
early nineteenth century’, Arch. Neurol., Sept. 1984,
41(9): 978–81.
71 Roger Smith, Inhibition: history and meaning in
the sciences of mind and brain, University of
California Press, 1992.
453Joel Peter Eigen
In the late nineteenth century, there was no shortage of scientiﬁc explanations to account
fordefectsinthebrain’sdevelopment(andbyextension,thelamentablefailuretoinhibitaso-
cial forces seething just below). Given the era’s preoccupation with the toll that unchecked
impulses could exact, it is of more than passing interest that degeneration theory—focusing
onthemorbiddeviationfromnormaldevelopment—andmaskedepilepsywereadvancedby
the same theorist. According to Morel, the morbid phenomena associated with degeneracy
could ﬁnd expression in mania, “dangerous” epilepsy, dementia, idiocy or imbecility, and
could change over time.72 Degeneracy could be manifested in insanity in one generation,
criminality in the next, and epilepsy in the third.73
Epilepsy of course did not have to wait for degeneration theory to give it organic ground-
ing; neurologists had long maintained that epileptic seizures were traceable to cerebral
lesions, although none had ever been successfully isolated and identiﬁed.74 Morel’s focus
was not epileptic lesion but epileptic character: an irritable, menacing, and, at its most
extreme, homicidally maniacal disposition. Much like the insane and the criminal, the
masked epileptic revealed the effects of corrosive, degenerative forces resulting in a loss
of control over thought and action. In sum, degeneracy theory provided late-nineteenth-
century deviance theorists with an explanation of how morbid deviation in an organism’s
heredity could result in the loss of its powers to inhibit violent impulses.
The failure to inhibit asocial impulses also found expression in evolutionary theory.
Complementing degeneration’s notion of morbid character, evolutionary theorists spoke of
epileptics as a class that, like the criminal, revealed fateful developmental arrest. Together
with the insane, who had also been consigned to a lower evolutionary plane, the epileptic
revealed not the backward slide of the degenerate but the simple failure to have evolved to a
fullyadultplane. Forthosewhopursuedaconnectionbetweeninhibitionandevolution, the
fact that the epileptic, the criminal, and the insane acted on impulse was hardly a mystery.
Dissipated habits or feckless forebears had not destroyed moral character; the elevated
sentiments had simply never been achieved.
Although degeneration and evolutionary theorists addressed different reasons for the
deviant’s mental and social state, ideas central to both could be invoked to explain any
and all forms of nineteenth-century social pathology. Maudsley, in particular, collapsed
developmental and hereditarianism defect: “[T]his criminal class constitutes a degenerate
or morbid variety of mankind, marked by peculiar low physical and mental character-
istics ...stupid, sullen, sluggish, deﬁcient in vital energy, and sometimes afﬂicted with
epilepsy.”75 Given the trenchant images put forward by degeneration and evolution, one
might conclude that the eventual acceptance of homicidal mania in the late-nineteenth-
century courtroom was if anything overdetermined: no matter where one looks, powerful
cultural beliefs framed the mentally, behaviourally, and legally wayward as the lamentable
result of failed development—prey to basic, unsocialized impulses—and, in consequence,
72 Bénédict-Augustin Morel, Traité des
dégénérescences physiques,
intellectuelles et morales de l’espèce humaine, Paris,
J-B Baillière, 1857, p. 77.
73 Morel’s ideas were embraced by Maudsley,
op. cit., note 46 above, p. 337.
74 “Let us admit frankly [Esquirol asserted] that
...pathological anatomy has shed little light on the
immediate seat of epilepsy.” Quoted in Temkin,
op. cit., note 55 above, p. 273.
75 Maudsley, op. cit., note 46 above, pp. 29–30.
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profoundlyill-equippedtomeetcontemporaryexpectationsofself-controlandthustomerit
the ascription of criminal culpability. Almost overdetermined.
It was not, after all, Morel’s Traité des dégénérescences or Lombroso’s L’Uomo
delinquente but successive editions ofAST aylor’s Principles and practice of medical jur-
isprudence that lawyers brandished in the courtroom. Although expressions such as “loss
of voluntary control” were standard courtroom fare, one will look in vain for unambiguous
allusionstodegeneracyorevolutioninforensicpsychiatrictestimony.ThatCharlesDarwin,
Herbert Spencer, and Cesare Lombroso inﬂuenced juristic attitudes regarding the emerging
medicalconceptionsofimpulsivecriminalitymaywellbeassumed, ofcourse. Afterall, one
could hardly construct an evolutionary history of medico-legal debate without evolution,
and yet one simply does not know what jurists and jurors were reading, listening to, or
discussing among their cohorts. The temptation to write history in terms of what courtroom
actors must have been thinking is particularly hazardous when confronted with the ubiquit-
ous tropes of evolution and degeneracy in contemporary recreations of the Victorian era’s
rolling social debate.
This caveat is not meant to question the importance of situating historical actors in
their moment and cultural space, but to suggest that the penetrating inﬂuence of histor-
ical moment and cultural space may be local as well as national. The English courtroom
had a history and a legal culture very much its own. Beginning with testimony invoking
moral insanity in the mid-1800s, the Old Bailey had repeatedly faced the riddle of how
and when to assign culpability to seemingly inexplicable criminality: mothers destroying
beloved infants, eminently reasonable persons killing their best friends, devoted spouses
assaulting loving partners where no history of animus or indeed even a precipitating incid-
ent had obtained. Such events challenged the tenets of the common law’s construction of
psychological man: a sentient being capable of understanding the nature and consequences
of his acts, and, by dint of this knowledge, able to inhibit the sway of unruly impulses.
To accept the existence of autonomous, impelling, unreﬂective impulses threatened to
undermine a normative standard of mental and behavioural functioning without which
no assignment of moral responsibility was possible. Still, the morally insane—however
deﬁned or characterized—were ubiquitous in the medical literature and on occasion,
in court.
Testimony gleaned from the Old Bailey Sessions Papers suggests that homicidal mania
gained acceptance in the late nineteenth century because it permitted the law to lodge
the inexplicable, perhaps even purposeless, murder in the sanctioned legal exception
of delusion or in a new species of a long-standing disease. By their calm questioning
and inquiring demeanour, jurists reveal no perceived threat to the sovereignty of legal
culture over its own world. If there was a role for evolution and degeneracy in the
courtroom’s acceptance of homicidal mania, it was in those cases when a defence res-
ted on masked epilepsy, with the criminal assault serving as a substitute for the physical
convulsion.
But even this nod at physiological upheaval was not a case of jurisprudence ceding
conceptual territory to an all-consuming scientiﬁc/social trope. The history of forensic psy-
chiatry is, ﬁrst and foremost, the history of law. Armed with innovative terms, medical
men may have ﬂooded the late-Victorian insanity trial with behaviourally consequential
diagnoses, but, to be successful, their testimony had to engage the common law’s chosen
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derangement: delusion. When the prisoner evinced no cognitive error, a mental convulsion
equivalent to an epileptic spasm could address the issue of volition. The late-Victorian
court would permit impulse no independent berth: there would be no autonomous home
for blind drives lodged in the passions. For “loss of control” to share testimonial billing
with an “inability to know the nature and consequences of one’s acts”, the physician’s testi-
mony had to await a forensic-psychiatric diagnosis that by its name and associated imagery
revealed a rare moment when legal and medical psychology saw the same defendant in
the dock.
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